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DE RUEHNE #1559 0651103  
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FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0832  
INFO RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE  
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6720  
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0171  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0529  
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 2086  
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 1929  
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0136  
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 2580  
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 2182  
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 1152  
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 2864  
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC  
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC  
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9418  
RHMFISS/HQ USCENCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI  
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

UNCLAS NEW DELHI 001559

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SENSITIVE

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TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [ENRG](#) [ETTC](#) [KSQA](#) [KNNP](#) [IN](#) [IAEA](#)  
SUBJECT: NEW DELHI-BASED CHIEFS OF MISSION BRIEFED ON  
U.S.-INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

REF: STATE 37461

¶1. (U) Drawing from reftel, DCM briefed New Delhi-based Chiefs of Mission and senior officers from key Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and IAEA member countries on March 3, including Israel and Pakistan, regarding the March 2 announcement that President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Singh had reached an understanding on India's proposed separation of civil and military nuclear facilities and programs, to enable U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation.

¶2. (U) Reaction from the invited diplomats was generally positive, reflecting the endorsement of the agreement that had already been expressed by the leaders of key NSG countries immediately following the March 2 announcement.

#### A FEW CLARIFICATIONS

¶3. (SBU) The Belgian DCM questioned whether the March 2 announcement -- by enabling access to international sources of uranium -- would spell the end of the long-running US effort to cap India's nuclear program. The Austrian Ambassador, likewise, questioned whether the terms of the March 2 deal (and India's ability to designate which facilities are civilian) would lead to a possibly shrinking percentage of India's facilities falling under safeguards. We explained that the small current size of India's nuclear industry, and the number of large output Russian and French projects in the pipeline, make it a virtual certainty that the percentage of India's total generating capacity under IAEA safeguards will rise quickly. As for the fungability of fuel and fissile material, we made the point that this is an apples/oranges question. The US-India agreement is designed to address India's legitimate energy requirements and to strengthen the international non-proliferation system by bringing the GOI into the international mainstream. As experience since 1974 demonstrates, uranium supply is not a significant constraint on India's weapons development; it is,

however, a major constraint on India's energy program. The UK PolCouns posed the question of where India stands in its consideration of the Proliferation Security Initiative. We explained that this remains a USG priority and we continue to get positive signals from the GOI, but this was not part of the March 2 framework.

(U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:  
(<http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/>)  
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